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Libya: Defining its Future
 Ranj Alaaldin
The international community is approaching the anniversary of its intervention in Libya last year. What started as a protest for greater rights and democracy quickly transformed into 
a military uprising against a vicious dictator intent on suppressing a revolution with every 
brutal means at his disposal. The conflict was distinct from other uprisings elsewhere in the 
region for three principal reasons: first, the brutality with which Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s 
regime responded; second, the audacity, tenacity and speed with which the Libyan people 
became militarily organised and capable of exploiting Gaddafi’s disintegrating military; and 
third, the involvement of the international community, in the form of the NATO alliance that 
was backed up by Arab support, particularly from the Gulf state of Qatar. 
This set of multi-faceted dynamics makes the Libyan case particularly special since they also reflect the 
existing political and security environment in the country; in other words, the host of different external 
actors, political and ideological factions at play in the overthrow of the former regime could reflect the 
post-conflict power-structures that will determine the shape of the new Libya. 
THE UPRISING
The Libyan revolution erupted after protestors took to the streets following the arrest on February 14 
of human rights lawyer Fathi Terbil, who represented relatives of more than 1,000 prisoners allegedly 
massacred by security forces in Tripoli’s infamous Abu Salim jail in 1996. According to reports, close to 
2,000 people gathered outside regime offices to demand his release. A ‘day of rage’ was then announced 
for February 17, at which point protests erupted across the country, but especially in the eastern towns 
and cities, which had a history of rebelling against Gaddafi’s regime. 
In Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city after Tripoli, tens of thousands took to the streets, torching police 
stations and besieging army barracks and the city’s airport. Regime loyalists were forced out of eastern 
towns including Bayda and the port town of Tobruk. In Zintan, south of Tripoli, hundreds of people 
marched through the streets; a police station and security forces premises were set on fire.
By early March, the Libyan protest movement transformed into a full-fledged armed conflict with 
the regime, which escalated as significant military and political defections took place and when it 
became clear that Gaddafi had no intention of accepting the protestors’ earlier demands or enter into 
negotiations with them. This led to the gradual creation of an enclave in Benghazi, with several other 
cities and towns in both the east and the west cleared of regime loyalists, though reports of regime 
snipers operating still persisted. 
In the run up to the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 on March 14, 
which sought to protect the population of Benghazi from being massacred after Gaddafi 
declared his intention to chase down the dissenters house to house, regime and revolutionary 
forces engaged in a tit-for-tat battle; both sides gained and lost territory as the battle continued. 
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This was in fact a process that favoured the regime. The 
rebels, poorly armed and unorganised, were unable 
to keep hold of territory, consolidate and build on 
their gains. The regime, on the other hand, had the 
benefit of superior weaponry, organised forces and 
training, thus having the advantage over the rag-tag 
army it was facing.
The March 14 intervention started a process of military 
engagement that begun to shift the balance of power 
and the conflict in the opposition’s favour. Slow at first, 
and wary of becoming engaged in yet another foreign 
conflict after Afghanistan and Iraq, the international 
community gradually increased and intensified its 
military support for the opposition, which entered 
Tripoli in September 2011 after nine months of conflict 
and forced the end of the regime. 
THE OPPOSITION
Self-defined, and established a week after the initial 
uprising began, the official opposition movement 
in Libya was the National Transitional Council 
(NTC), which now constitutes the country’s interim 
government until elections are held. The NTC is 
headed by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the former regime’s 
justice minister, and its underlying purpose was to 
give the armed uprising an organisational structure 
that allowed it to effectively defeat the former regime 
– thus rendering the establishment of the entity a 
necessity. 
Initially comprised of a 30-member leadership council 
and an executive committee that took charge of daily 
responsibilities, the NTC was and still is composed 
of individuals that come from different ideological, 
political and professional backgrounds: secularist, 
Islamist and technocratic. According to the NTC, 
they were co-opted on the basis of their expertise 
and the extent to which they were linked with the 
former regime, in that any individuals with “blood 
on their hands” were prevented from joining. Since 
the downfall of Gaddafi, the NTC has grown into a 
50-member council with a cabinet of ministers that 
take charge of the country’s affairs, including the 
provisioning of basic services, public expenditure and 
preparing the country for elections. 
Despite this apparently smooth transition from 
opposition to interim administration, the NTC has 
been plagued by a series of deficiencies. Divisions 
have been rife along Islamist-secularist lines. The 
NTC was also thrown into disarray after the murder 
last year by an opposition Islamist brigade of former 
regime interior minister Abdul Fatah Younes, who 
had become the NTC’s defence minister. 
More pressing during and after the conflict has been 
a failure to remedy the NTC’s democratic deficit to 
the satisfaction of the Libyan people, who in recent 
months have voiced their discontent by protesting 
against their interim government’s lack of transparency 
and slow progress. The January 2012 NTC appointed 
cabinet, for example, failed to release the names of 
all its members. Currently, the discontent centres 
around a lack of transparency – especially vis-à-vis 
NTC meetings and decision-making processes – NTC 
members and aspects of public expenditure.
WHY AUTHORITY MATTERS 
GivAs it stands, the NTC has made slow progress since 
Gaddafi was toppled, as indicated by recent events 
including the desecration of British war graves, the 
declaration of autonomy by the Eastern regions, and 
clashes between armed groups, as well as the abuse 
of prisoners. 
The importance of authority ultimately comes from 
a need to stabilise Libya, steer it towards democratic 
elections and, ultimately, exploit the country’s 
enormous potential. It has a $65 billion sovereign 
wealth fund, whilst oil production will soon reach 
pre-conflict levels of 1.6 million barrels a day. The 
hydrocarbons sector can therefore drive economic 
growth in the short term while the private sector is 
developed and a legal framework is constructed. Libya 
should attract foreign investment: it has a young and 
well-educated population that boasts the highest 
literacy rate in Africa.
But the NTC has little authority and was, in truth, 
little more than a mouthpiece for the loose and 
decentralised structure of the uprising throughout 
the conflict. Since the downfall of the former regime, 
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it is still to centralise authority and has faced difficulties 
managing the logistical and organisational demands 
that come with  paying salaries and providing basic 
services and humanitarian assistance.
Within Libya, power is currently concentrated in 
disparate military circles that dominate their respective 
areas of influence in the east and the west. These 
fighters were the ‘Free Libya’ fighting groups that 
developed from the bottom up, independently of one 
another. The most prominent revolutionary brigades 
come from the previously besieged city of Misrata in 
the east and Zintan in the west, which in the weeks 
leading up to Gaddafi’s downfall made a decisive 
contribution to the uprising by tightening the noose 
around Tripoli. 
The NTC has almost no control over these forces, 
comprised of fighters who, rather than operating 
as some homogenous combat entity, actually 
operate as per a social contract between an array 
of individuals, technocrats, prominent tribes and 
families and businesses, within any given major city 
that they control and derive their authority from 
(like Misrata for example which, in addition to its 
famous revolutionaries, boasts a series of prominent 
technocrats and businesspeople). The Misrata and 
Zintan brigades have both refused to recognise the 
authority of the NTC.
There has been some co-ordination between militias 
and the NTC but a unified command structure 
integrating them both does not exist. Herein lies the 
problem. Independent or semi-independent fighting 
forces could be acceptable but only if integrated into 
a proper power-sharing mechanism. As of now, the 
NTC’s lack of authority combined with the absence 
of a respected national army and police force is likely 
to be conducive to an environment in which violent 
clashes take place between militias and NTC forces 
(and between rival militia groups themselves); as 
well as further compound problems of transparency, 
accountability and human rights abuses.
More broadly, these deficiencies have profound 
consequences for the future of the region as well as 
the interests of the international community, largely 
because of the proliferation of arms and the open 
borders that cannot be properly policed without 
organised security forces. 
The militias’ power reflects that of the Islamists 
advantage, since the most powerful of militia brigades 
are comprised of and have close links to Islamist groups 
and individuals. The Islamists were described as being 
the most organised, effective, heavily armed and 
audacious of the ‘Free Libya’ revolutionaries. Militias 
in the east for example boast the Sallabi brothers, 
including leading cleric Ali al-Sallabi and his brother 
Ismael al-Sallabi, whose role during the uprising was 
to lead an umbrella group of fighters in the east. 
The Sallabi brothers’ prominence is further amplified 
because of their existing networks and formidable 
resources that stem from the Gulf, especially from 
Qatar, which provided Islamist brigades with aid and 
arms. Significantly, this was done independently of 
the NTC and despite NTC objections. 
In post-Gaddafi Libya, Islamists have gained further 
recognition in the country’s interim constitution, 
which regards Islamic jurisprudence (sharia) as ‘the 
principal source of legislation’ – clearly a measure 
of appeasement since there were no widespread 
demands for this among the population.  Senior NTC 
sources themselves acknowledge that the Islamists 
are recognised as the ‘do’ers’; that is, they have the 
capacity and ability to deliver, whilst the NTC has 
been derided for its inability to take command and 
take decisions. The forthcoming elections in June, 
which will elect a 200-member national assembly to 
draft Libya’s new constitution, may remedy the NTC’s 
democratic deficit. In truth, however, elections could 
essentially transplant the existing circles of power and 
influence, in particular those of the Islamists.
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THE FUTURE
The new Libya is still in a transitional phase and it has 
been little over six months since Gaddafi was toppled 
and the country liberated in its entirety. It is, therefore, 
important to maintain perspective; whilst there are 
many problems, there is little to suggest that they will 
take the country to the brink. 
Much will depend on the extent to which the country 
is stabilised before the elections take place in June, 
for the fear is that failure to remedy the problems 
of authority and accountability will compromise 
the prospects for stability, representative governance 
and, as things stand, enable militia leaders to translate 
their military clout and revolutionary status into 
political status, to the detriment of any genuine 
democratic process. 
The possibility of civil war is often raised among a 
minority of skeptics, most of whom were opposed to 
the international community’s intervention last year. 
Clashes have indeed already taken place between rival 
militias, as well as between NTC forces and militia 
brigades. They are also likely to continue, especially 
given the prevalence of weapons in the country. 
However, they will be localised, unorganised and not 
between entire regions or organised groups with large 
armies and sophisticated weaponry, variables which 
are necessary if a devastating civil war is to take place. 
Similarly, Libya has the benefit of being a largely 
homogenous and small country, with a population 
of Sunni Muslims, most of whom live in the cities 
of the Mediterranean seaboard. As a result of its 
homogenous characteristics, post-conflict Libya also 
has an advantage over post-conflict Iraq since no 
major segment of its population is agitated at its loss 
of power to the extent that it resorts to mounting an 
insurgency or engaging in terrorist atrocities. Iraq’s 
Sunni population, on the other hand, bemoaned 
their loss of power and feared a future in which its 
rights would not be protected – despite a written 
constitution guaranteeing these rights – creating 
resentment and inflaming sectarian tensions with the 
country’s majority Shia population.  
It is, however, important to have a capable and 
somewhat centralised security apparatus, so that any 
gains in the new Libya are not reversed. Regardless of 
whether decentralisation is embraced, Libya still needs 
a respected and organised security apparatus that can 
enforce law and order. The existing gaps in security 
provide for lawlessness, disorder, and clashes between 
armed groups and militias; as well as weakening 
Libya’s ability to defend itself against outside forces. 
If, on the other hand, the existing model of 
decentralised authority with a weak government 
in Tripoli is the preferred model, then Libyans must 
find a way to turn this into a proper power-sharing 
mechanism. Whilst embracing federalism or any 
decentralised system of governance will, for some 
Libyans, be tantamount to partition, it will also be 
seen by many as a means of preventing power from 
becoming too centralised in Tripoli (that is, centralised 
to such an extent that it produces another dictatorial 
regime) and as a means of reversing the neglect that 
the periphery suffered under the former regime’s 
rule. Partition itself is unlikely if not impossible, 
given that there exists no support for it among the 
broader Libyan population. The threat of partition, 
however, could be used to garner concessions in 
future political negotiations.
What will be key before any elections take place, or 
indeed before any constitutional process is started, 
is the reconciling of differences between different 
political and ideological factions, between new and 
old power bases, tribes and regions; these are elements 
which have either experienced neglect under the 
Gaddafi regime or who now fear for their future 
under Libya’s new rulers. In other words, Libya needs 
stabilisation, which can be achieved provided Libyans 
are given a stake in the future of their country. Interests 
must, therefore, be merged and differences must be 
remedied to create a post-conflict environment of 
stability, and create an inclusive and representative 
government that defines the country through genuine 
democratic elections. ■
